

## The “Family Jewels” Report – Excerpts

Excerpted and Compiled by Erowid

### Introduction

by Lux, Erowid Staff Writer

The following is a collection of excerpts from the CIA's infamous “Family Jewels” report that was declassified and published to the CIA website on June 26, 2007. These documents were assembled from the collated PDF version made available by the National Security Archive at George Washington University<sup>1</sup>.

The Family Jewels report was the result of a general order by CIA Director James Schlesinger given May 7, 1973 to all CIA employees instructing them to report any activity “which might be construed by reasonable people to be outside the legislative charter of [the CIA]” (see pp. 3-4 below). Schlesinger apparently issued the order to prepare for his role in the ongoing Watergate investigations, and indeed much of the resulting 703 page report pertains to persons and operations related to Watergate crimes. This collection of documents and memos became known as the “Family Jewels”.

The Family Jewels report gained notoriety after part of it was leaked to investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, who wrote an article for the *New York Times* in December 1974. His article describes a National Security Agency (NSA) operation in which more than 250,000 pieces of domestic first-class mail were intercepted and photographed by that agency – a serious violation of their charter and of Federal law.

The *New York Times* article precipitated an outcry that led directly to three investigations led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, Senator Edward “Ted” Kennedy, and Senator Frank Church. The Church Committee convened for nearly three years and eventually produced an enormous report that copiously documented numerous illegal operations. Among the most notorious were CIA Project MKULTRA in which US citizens were given LSD by CIA agents without their knowledge or consent, and the FBI operation COINTELPRO in which putatively-subversive people and groups ranging from the Black Panther Party to the Parent Teacher Association were scrutinized and, in some cases, made the target of harassment<sup>2</sup>.

In 2007, amid much fanfare and press coverage, the original Family Jewels document was released. While a complete analysis of the 703-page report has not yet been completed, the report appears to contain few, if any, revelations. Most of the material documented in the report has been a matter of public record since the time of the Church Committee hearings. In addition, the Family Jewels report has been heavily redacted, and a full 15% of the pages in the report have been completely blanked out.

Nonetheless, some of the documents have some historical interest. Documents that pertain to areas of Erowid interest, especially projects involving drugs or “narcotics”, have been collected in this volume.

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1 Full report available for download here: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm>, accessed June 28, 2007.

2 For more information on MKULTRA, and for links to the transcripts of the Kennedy Hearings and a downloadable version of the Church Committee report, see Erowid's *Psychoactives, Covert Operations, and War Vault* at [Erowid.org/psychoactives/war/](http://Erowid.org/psychoactives/war/)

## Table of Contents

<b>Description</b>	<b>Page Number</b>	<b>Page Number in Original Report</b>
Director James Schlesinger's original general order to report actions outside of the CIA charter	3-4	439-40
<b>MKULTRA and Edgewood Arsenal</b>		
CIA/Army project in which behavioral drugs that had been rejected because of negative side effects are delivered to the US Army Edgewood Arsenal for animal experiments and testing on US Military volunteers	5	417
Senior CIA official Carl Duckett believes the Director would be ill-advised to say he is acquainted with MKULTRA	6	213
MKULTRA Director Sidney Gottlieb reports the support the Technical Services Division has given other Agencies	7-8	215-6
<b>CIA and BNDD Corruption</b>		
Howard Osborn describes Project TWO-FOLD (also TWOFOLD) in which the CIA assisted the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) in forming an internal security unit to investigate corruption within the BNDD	9-10	56-57
BNDD head Robert Ingersoll asked CIA Director Richard Helms for assistance in recruiting agents for narcotics investigation as well as internal affairs issues	11	62
Excerpt from a memo by Harry Pisner describing Project TWOFOLD	12	106
CIA Directorate of Intelligence sets "Trap" on leaks of Narcotics Intelligence	13	389
<b>CIA and Narcotics Crime Investigation</b>		
CIA assists law enforcement in monitoring putatively drug-related telephone communication between the United States and South America	14-15	140-1
Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Director of Domestic Contact Service describes the conditions under which the CIA will accept information on the narcotics trade	16-20	180-2, 184-5
<b>Miscellaneous Drug-Related Operations</b>		
The Poppy Project	21	200
Memo on an undescribed CIA-funded "heroin study"	22	393
Telephone and Mail Surveillance	23	332
"CIA Narcotics Activities Having Domestic Implications"	24-25	534-6
<b>Procedural Items of Interest</b>		
Director of CIA described as talking to Agency employees about misleading press	26-8	454-6
General Counsel Lawrence Houston recommends against illegal surveillance	29-30	548-9

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~*My first**for communication in*

7 MAY 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES

1. Recent press reports implicate CIA in certain ~~illegal~~ *improper* activities allegedly committed in the United States. Without going into the details of these allegations, I can assure you that I intend to cooperate fully with the various law enforcement and Congressional investigations of these matters.

2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude toward matters of this sort. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within the strictest interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:

- I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed by reasonable people to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.

00430

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

- I hereby order every person presently employed by CIA to report to me directly on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information shall call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about "questionable CIA activities".
- I intend to name a highly respected person from outside the Government to review, investigate, and prepare reports for me on any apparent violations of the CIA legislative charter which are brought to his attention or may be uncovered on his own initiative. I shall give this person complete and unrestricted access to all records and persons in the Agency.

4. To insure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:

Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately.

James R. Schlesinger  
Director

00431

MEMORANDUM TO : Executive Secretary  
CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT @ Drug Testing Program

1. The attached summary from ORD describes research into a behavioral drug. Conversations with Carl Duckett indicate that the reported drug was part of a larger program in which ~~whereby~~ the Agency had relations with commercial drug manufacturers, whereby they passed on drugs rejected because of unfavorable side effects. The drugs were screened with the use of ADP equipment, and those selected for experimentation were tested at [redacted] [redacted] using monkeys and mice. Materials <sup>having</sup> ~~of~~ further interest, as demonstrated by this testing, were then tested at Edgwood, using volunteer members of the Armed Forces.

2. The program was terminated last fall. The computer program remains in the machine, its final disposition not yet having been decided.

3. Carl Duckett emphasizes that the program was considered as defensive, in the sense that we would be able to recognize certain behavior if similar materials were used against Americans.

WVB

00413

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Carl Duckett brought this up and said he is very uncomfortable with what Sid Gottlieb is reporting and thinks the Director would be ill-advised to say he is acquainted with this program. Duckett plans to scrub it down with Gottlieb but obviously cannot do it this afternoon.

[Redacted]

Bep Evans

8 May 1973

(DATE)

00213

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science &amp; Technology

SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.


5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

E2 IMPDET  
CL BY 059098~~SECRET~~

00215

- 2 -

6. Issuance of forged personal identity documentation by TSD is controlled according to two broad criteria: type of requester; and type of documentation requested. A request for denied area documentation from a DDO Area Division is honored after proper validation. Free world documentation may require some extra coordination however.



7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher Agency authority, no U.S. documentation is issued by TSD Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. TSD Regional Bases require at least the validation of U.S. documentation requests by the COS, or his designated representative, of the requesting Station. Because it could be used [redacted] no U.S. Birth Certificate is issued without approval of the DDO via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards are issued by Office of Security, not TSD.

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

Attachment

Distribution:

O &amp; I - Addressee, w/att

  
 Sidney Gottlieb

Chief

Technical Services Division

00216

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Executive Registry
77-1225

26 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary,  
CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Project TWO-FOLD

1. This memorandum sets forth a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 5.

2. For the past several years, this office has been supporting the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) by spotting, assessing, and recruiting personnel to form an internal security unit whose primary mission is the detection of corruption within the BNDD. Subsequent to the recruitment and training stage, the individuals selected are turned over to the Chief Inspector of BNDD for operational guidance and handling in their various domestic assignments.

3. Recently, this Agency has extended this activity by supporting BNDD in the covert acquisition of individuals who are hired as Staff Agents utilized under nonofficial cover and directed against the principal international drug traffickers. These individuals are true employees of the BNDD and, although all administrative details relative to their employment are handled within the Agency, they are unaware of any Agency involvement.

4. It is felt at this time that a reaffirmation of our support to BNDD in Project TWO-FOLD is necessary and desirable.

5. Therefore, it is recommended that approval be granted for the continuation of Project TWO-FOLD as originally approved by the Director of Central Intelligence on 12 February 1971.

  
Howard J. Osborn  
Director of Security

00056

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Project TWO-FOLD

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_ \*

DISAPPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Distribution:

Orig. - Return to OS

1 - ER

1 - IG

\* Per Mr. Colby's recommendation and DCI concurrence, terminate paragraph 2 activity and continue paragraph 3 only as the activity pertains to foreign assignments to collect narcotics intelligence abroad. Copy furnished IG.

Ben C. Evans, Jr.  
O/ES,   
29 MAY 1973

~~SECRET~~

00057


~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

7 May 1973

Memorandum to: The Inspector General


Subject: Office of Security Survey - Office of Security Support to BNDD

1. In December 1970 Robert Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, asked Mr. Helms if the Agency could give him some assistance in shoring up the internal integrity of the BNDD. According to Ingersoll, the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics had been heavily infiltrated by dishonest and corrupt elements, who were believed to have ties with the narcotics smuggling industry. Ingersoll wanted us to help him recruit some thoroughly reliable people who could be used, not only as special agents in his various offices around the country, but also to serve as informants on the other BNDD employees in these offices.



062

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

protect foreign visitors. Recently, [redacted] was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. [redacted] served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

26 May 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DDI "Trap" on Leaks of Narcotics Intelligence

1. In material provided by the DDI on contacts with certain persons on the White House Staff, there is a 9 September 1972 memorandum from Mr. Helms to Dr. Kissinger relating the identification of a leak to the press as having been in the BNDD. The memorandum states in part:

"After noting that Jack Anderson had a continuing source for classified documents on narcotics, we arranged a trap so that recipient organizations of CIA Intelligence Memoranda (IM) on narcotics could be identified."

2.

3. This course of action was at the initiative of the Directorate of Intelligence, without consultation with persons elsewhere in the government, except in reporting the results to Dr. Kissinger. It represents a well-conceived attempt to target on a possible source of leaks. We doubt that it would be susceptible to misunderstanding if exposed to public view, but the fact is that it was something of an attempt to trap someone, and it was a part of the general attempt to seal off a leak similar to those leading to the "plumbing" operation. Because of the latter consideration it is noted for the record.

SIGNED

S. D. Breckinridge

✓  
cc:

00387

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC [REDACTED]

8 May 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT:** Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),  
Office of Communications, Operational  
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit, which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the DDO's [REDACTED]

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,

[REDACTED] where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT~~

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

00140

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

8 May 1973

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Support. [REDACTED] has been and is presently being given to FBI projects [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an [REDACTED] HF/DF system was [REDACTED] conducted [REDACTED] DIVISION D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

[REDACTED]

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

00141

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's  
Legislative Charter

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter.

2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:

Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.

Mitchell: While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.

00180

~~SECRET~~  
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Young: Harry Eisenbeiss and [redacted] of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.

- [redacted]

- DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.

- [redacted]

- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.

- [redacted]

- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

-2-


~~SECRET~~  
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

00181

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.
- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.



- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e. g. , to the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.
- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has gone on for three decades without problems.
- FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.



EDWARD W. PROCTOR  
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments


7 May 1973

D054

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f (i) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if misinterpreted. For example:




5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.
6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.


00184


~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity



10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.



  
JAMES R. MURPHY

Director, Domestic Contact Service

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

8 May 1973

Questionable NPIC Projects1. Leaks of Jack Anderson

In January 1972, NPIC performed image enhancement techniques on TV tapes of a Jack Anderson show. The purpose was to try to identify serial numbers of CIA documents in Anderson's possession. The request was level on NPIC through the Office of Security.

2. The Poppy Project

NPIC has provided the services of one PI to assist an interagency effort to detect poppy cultivation. In addition the Center has provided the contractual mechanism in support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for a multispectral crop study by a private company.

3. Reviews of NASA Collected Imagery

NPIC has and continues to conduct reviews of satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify "sensitive" frames of photography not releasable to the public and to ascertain the intelligence potential of the imagery. This service has been provided for GEMINI and ERTS photography and preparations are underway for review of SKY LAB imagery.

4. Peaceful Uses of Satellite Imagery

NPIC has been requested to provide a number of looks at domestic coverage for special purposes. Examples include:

- Santa Barbara Oil Spill
- Los Angeles Earthquake
- Sierra Snow (flood threat)
- Current Mississippi Floods
- Hurricane Camille Damage on the Coast of the Gulf of Mexico
- Civil Disturbance in Detroit
- OEP U.S. Data Base

00200

~~Administrative - Internal Use Only~~

25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Broe

SUBJECT : Reported Agency Funding of Heroin Study

1. ORD, in reporting association of employees with Egil Krogh in connection with the government narcotics program, referred to an Agency funding action on 30 June 1972 whereby \$37,500 was transferred to OST (the Office of Science and Technology under the Executive) from ORD's budget. The money was to fund a study proposed by IDA (I am told this is the Institute for Defense Analysis), and was approved by the DDI, ADD/S&T, [redacted] acting for the DDS, and Mr. Colby as Executive Director-Comptroller.

2. I judge this to be a proper and normal expenditure within the government in connection with a high priority government program on narcotics. I recommend that this not be reported as an action subject to external criticism.

[redacted]  
S. D. Breckinridge

00391

~~SECRET~~Page 23 Prohibition against COMINT vs. US citizens

In September 1972 [redacted] Commo to conduct hearability tests of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the US and South America. The circuits carried drug-related traffic. [redacted]

[redacted] The tests were successful. The activity was terminated on 30 Jan 73 following OGC determination that they were illegal.

We conduct an intercept operation in [redacted] targeted on radio telephone conversations [redacted]. These intercepts contain a large number of unrelated conversations often involving US citizens.

Testing in the US of ORD-developed electronic collection systems occasionally result in the collection of domestic telephone conversations. When the tests are complete, the intercepted material is destroyed.

CIA [redacted] technicians conducted tests in the Miami area in August 1971 of DF gear intended for use against a Soviet agent in South Vietnam. While wholly innocuous, the tests preceded the holding of the conventions there and could be construed as being somehow related to them.

In February 1972 CIA asked an official of AT&T for copies of telephone call slips relating to US-China calls. The operation lasted for three or four months and then dried up. OGC stated its belief that the collection of these slips did not violate the Communications Act since eavesdropping was not involved.

Page 29 Mail coverage

Since 1953, CIA has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selected mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This program is now dormant pending decision on whether to continue or to abolish it.

~~SECRET~~

00331

7 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: CIA Narcotics Activities Having  
Domestic Implications

1. This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of activities and relationships that might have domestic implications.

2. We occasionally report on the activities of American citizens involved in narcotics trafficking abroad. This information is normally disseminated to U.S. law enforcement agencies and other recipients of our reports. We also occasionally request U.S. law enforcement agencies for name traces on U.S. citizens who are known or suspected to be involved in narcotics trafficking abroad.

00525

00524

officials working abroad on foreign narcotics investigations. The present method of handling such requests is for us to request the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations prior to asking the Technical Services Division to comply. We insist on knowing the true identity of the persons to use such documentation and limit them to staff officers of the U.S. law enforcement agencies. We also require that we know the purpose and intended use of the documents. Finally, we require receipts from the headquarters of the agency involved and the individual, and also require these documents to be returned to us for destruction after they have fulfilled their use. We have turned down requests from BNDD for alias documentation for domestic use. There are some indications in the files that there have been requests from BNDD for domestic documentation in connection with their domestic investigations. These predate NARCOG, and we are unable to determine how these requests were handled.

6. We periodically receive requests for technical assistance in the form of photographic and audio devices or guidance for use of such items by U.S. law enforcement agencies in connection with their foreign investigations of illicit narcotics activities. We require these agencies to adhere to the same procedures we require in our own operations. From time-to-time we have honored these requests and have provided sterile equipment when the requests have been properly presented and approved. Our records show evidence that several such requests were made prior to the existence of NARCOG in connection with narcotics law enforcement investigations in the United States. We are unable to determine whether the requests were fulfilled.

Chief, DDO/NARCOG

~~SECRET~~ALLEGATION:

In a variety of ways it has been alleged that CIA is working within the United States, with particular attention to extremist groups.

FACTS:

1. Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, subparagraph D3, states, "The Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on 14 April 1971, the Director stated:

"I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens."

In the Director's "State of the Agency" speech to employees on 17 September 1971, he said:

"I gave a talk to the American Society of Newspaper Editors last winter, as you know, and I did it for only one purpose. That was to try and put in the record a few of these denials that we've all wanted to see put in the public record for some time. And you can rely on those denials. They're true, and you can use that as any text that you may need to demonstrate that we're not in the drug traffic, and that we're not trying to do espionage on American citizens in the United States, and we're not tapping telephone lines, and that we're not doing a lot of other things which we're accused of doing. One of the things that tends to perpetuate some of these silly ideas are jokes that are made about them, particularly about domestic espionage. Although the jokes have no basis in fact they nevertheless give us a name which we don't deserve. I don't say that that makes all that much difference, but it does make some difference, and this tends to spill over, so I would like to suggest that if you have it in your hearts to do so that you speak up when the occasion arises and try and set the facts straight."

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2. From time to time some employees have been concerned that Agency activities might conflict with these statements. They can be assured that Agency activities do not. For clarification, some activities which may have been subject to misunderstanding are listed as follows:

a. Domestic Contacts. The Domestic Contact Service establishes discreet but overt relationships with American private citizens, commercial, academic and other organizations and resident aliens for the purposes of collecting on a voluntary basis foreign intelligence information or soliciting their cooperation in assisting the Agency to perform its mission overseas. Records of the individuals and organizations cooperating with the Agency are maintained as a necessary practical element of this process.

b. Security Investigations. Security investigations are conducted on prospective employees, contractors, and consultants, and on security problems which arise. These investigations involve a wide range of investigative procedures, including neighborhood inquiries, checks with other Government agencies, review of credit reports, and interviews with former employers and business associates. This is essential to assure that our personnel possess a high degree of personal integrity, sense of responsibility, and competence and to protect classified information and sensitive intelligence sources and methods. The resulting files are held separately by the Office of Security and are not merged with other Agency files.

c. Foreign Resources. On some occasions, foreign citizens of interest to CIA are contacted and recruited in America for work abroad. The purpose of this activity is entirely restricted to the Agency's foreign operations.

d. Recruitment. CIA recruiters maintain a wide variety of contacts within the United States, assisting individuals interested in employment with CIA to learn more about it and to join its employee force.

e. Contracting. In the course of CIA business and operations, a number of contracts for procurement, research, or analysis are made with a variety of U.S. companies and individuals. This in no way constitutes operations in the U.S. but rather secures the assistance of these groups in carrying out the CIA mission against foreign targets.

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f. Operations. The 1967 Katzenbach Committee report was approved by the Director in March 1967 and is binding on any of our relations with American organizations today. It specifically prohibits covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any U. S. educational or private voluntary organization. Any relationship or operation the Agency has with an American organization must be and is within these guidelines.

g. Details or Loans. On rare occasions, details of technically qualified CIA personnel, technical advice, or loans of CIA equipment have been made available to other U. S. agencies at their request to assist them to carry out their responsibilities. An example is the skymarshall program, in which some CIA personnel were temporarily detailed to the FAA in order to assist in a rapid initiation of that program. Such personnel and equipment are under the operational control of the receiving agency. Assistance of this nature in no way constitutes an assumption of responsibility or authority by CIA for the program.

h. Counterintelligence and Drugs. To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services aimed at the U. S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U. S., including activities aimed at the U. S. utilizing U. S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA's responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U. S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA's responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces. (CIA's assistance to the U. S. Government program against narcotics and drugs is handled in the same fashion.)

i. Operational Support. To support CIA operations, arrangements are made with various U. S. business or other entities to provide cover or other support for CIA personnel or activities abroad. This can include proprietaries formed or controlled by CIA. While these may exist within the U. S., their purpose is to conduct or support operations abroad.

j. Defectors. As provided by law, CIA occasionally resettles in the U. S. defectors and other foreign individuals of operational interest. This resettlement may involve a new identity, relocation, employment, etc. Although this activity takes place in this country, its purpose is the support of operations abroad.

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29 January 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Division D

SUBJECT: Intercept of Communications in the U. S.

REFERENCE: 26 Jan 73 Memo for GC fr AC/Division D,  
Same Subject

1. In referent you request our views as to the legal aspects of a radio telephone intercept activity carried on at our communications site [Redacted]

2. The basic law is contained in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. 605, which prohibits interception of any radio communication without the authorization of the sender and also prohibits divulging the substance thereof to any person. Chapter 119 of Title 18, U. S. C., makes the interception of any wire or oral communication a crime punishable by \$10,000 or five years' imprisonment, or both. There are two exceptions to these prohibitions:

a. The first provides for application through the Department of Justice to a Federal court for a court order authorizing such interception for specific purposes in connection with law-enforcement duties. Since this Agency is prohibited by statute from any police or law-enforcement activities, obviously we cannot operate under this exception.

b. The other exception is contained in section 2511 of Title 18, U. S. C., at subsection (3). This provides that the prohibition cited above on interception shall not

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect against attack, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States or to protect such information, and to protect the United States against overthrow by force or other unlawful means or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

3. The type of information you describe in your memorandum does not appear to fall within any of these categories and since its ultimate destination is BNDD, it appears to be collection for law-enforcement purposes, which as noted above is barred to this Agency by statute.

4. For your information, in most cases where there is a criminal prosecution for violation of the narcotics laws, the Department of Justice queries us as to whether we have engaged in any interception in connection with the defendants. If a case should involve the interception being made [redacted] it would be deemed to be unauthorized and in all probability the prosecution would have to be dropped by the Government. It is our view, therefore, that such interception should be carried on by appropriate law-enforcement agencies in accordance with the authority of chapter 119 of Title 18, U. S. C.



LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON  
General Counsel

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00539